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Social Welfare in East and West – A Tranquilizer for Dialogue
Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt and Bonn Juego1
Executive summary
According to the discourse of elites in East and Southeast Asia public social policy before and
after the financial crises in 1997 and 2008 has been supportive of a small public sector, free
trade and the allocation of growth in the market-place. This approach relied on a Weberian-
type explanation emphasizing a set of Confucian or proclaimed Asian values such as hard
work,  discipline,  enterprise,  family,  thrift,  responsibility  and  respect  for  authority.  It  was
furthermore  based  on  an  a  deliberate  philosophy  and  particularistic  strategy  of  not
emphasizing any measures of social welfare state or publicly sanctioned entitlements, as this
would most certainly decrease national competitiveness in global markets. This approach has
recently been challenged by pressures from the labor sector which in tandem with increased
democratization is pressuring the political agenda regarding provisions of state sanctioned
welfare  and  social  security.  The  old-style  authoritarianism based  on  “Asianism”  and  the
policy on growth priority at any cost is being questioned. It seems that an important outcome
of the financial crises and the emerging democratic space has entailed greater demands for
public provision of social welfare and more articulated political expressions for collective
entitlements. An important prospect might be a "soft" restructuring of the present custodian
developmental state towards a more redistributive public sector with characteristics of a social
welfare state.
Objective and approach
Globalization and new information technologies are eroding long-standing socio-economic,
cultural  and  political  boundaries  in  East  and  Southeast  Asia:  Programmes  of  economic
liberalization and transitions to democratic policies are transforming the parameters of public
policy;  and there are significant  differences between strata,  classes,  generations,  time and
spatial perspectives across the region in terms of  outcome of these basic transformations.
These tendencies simultaneously open up new avenues for growth and enhanced individual
wealth capacities, but also create new forms of unevenness and exclusion.  Democratization
and decentralization might lead to greater demands for public welfare provisions and renewed
challenges to the nation-state.
The paper considers the debate about social welfare policy and labor market policy from a
structuralist political economy perspective by first focusing on the political and ideological
content of the controversy on the issue of attitudes toward entitlements; second by exploring
the  impact of existing social welfare policies in Southeast Asia compared with other regions;
thirdly it explores the class nexus between labor organizations approach to social policy and
the relationship with labor market regulations, policies on qualification and upgrading of labor
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skills,  and  finally  the  analysis  sets  up  three  possible  scenarios  regarding  social  reform
initiatives which might prove important in the near future.
The main purpose of the contribution is  to provide a critical assessment of  social policies in
Southeast Asia (Thailand and Indonesia in particular, but also Malaysia and the Philippines) in
a comparative perspective with the East Asian experience (Japan, Korea and Taiwan - excl.
labor), and the Scandinavian experience with corporatism (incl. labor).  Are there lessons to
be learned from models of social provisioning, with the ultimate objective of ensuring decent
and secure lives for all citizens - particularly the poor, the excluded sectors in society and the
unemployed? However, given the degree of uncertainty that currently prevails, this paper will
not attempt to offer definite conclusions or policy prescriptions. As a matter of fact, in terms
of social welfare, equity and labor market policies the pre-crisis model of East Asia might
offer lessons for the West and vice versa. Mutual learning and dialogue must be the key for
future understanding and cooperation.
Social Welfare in East and West – A Tranquilizer for Dialogue
Lesson No.1. is that government handouts do not alleviate the underlying
causes of  income disparity.  No.2: attempts to redress such gaps through
taxation and welfare spending end up alienating the rich and fostering a
debilitating dependence among the  poor.  Lesson No.  3:  nations  running
chronic  deficits  lose  their  international  credibility.  Their  competitiveness
erodes, and global investors punish them by refusing to buy bonds issues by
their governments unless they offer very high interest rates (Asiaweek 26
January, 1996: 19 cf. Ramesh 2000b: 194).
Introduction
In  1997  the  economic  miracle  in  Asia  came  to  an  impasse.  What  many
academics  (Bello  and  Rosenfeld  1990;  Schmidt  1997)  had  known for  years
became  manifest  in  an  economic  and  social  crisis  which  soon  spread  into
pluralities of crises rivaling the public debt crisis in Latin America in the 1970s
and 1980s,  and the aftermath of  the Great  Depression in the 1930s.  In fact,
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Korea saw more than 100 billion$ fleeing the
countries with massive social, economic and political consequences, and many
observers even from the International Financial Institutions (IFI) changed their
vocabulary and began talking about recession or even depression. 
Although  the  underlying  reason  for  what  caused  the  crises  and  subsequent
impacts and  consequences begs a number of queries, and although we already
do have a plethatory of writings and explanations, one pertinent question stands
out: Why didn’t  the East and Southeast Asian policy-elites, their constituencies,
and domestic and foreign policy advisors prepare the ground for the crisis and
related to  this  why was there  an absence of  a  minimum social  security  net,
which could  have contributed to a less dramatic outcome. 
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At least in short-term perspective there was a rapid growth of unemployment
and poverty following in the footsteps of the crisis. In the longer perspective the
crisis has led to a rethinking of the so-called ”East Asian miracle”. Once held up
by the multilateral agencies as a model for world capitalism (World Bank 1993),
the crisis prone economies are now shown to the world as deficient because of
structural  distortions.  As stressed by the first  managing Director of the IMF,
Stanley  Fischer,  “It  is  striking  that  models  run  out  of  string  at  some point.
Communism  worked  very  well  for  thirty  or  forty  years  and  then  started
collapsing.  Crony  capitalism  delivered  for  a  long  time  in  Asia  but  that
interlocking nexus of banks, governments, corporations became quite rotten and
it is rotten in the countries in crisis and they have to be reformed.” likewise the
Managing  Director  Michel  Camdessus  offered  this  comment: ”It  would be a
mistake to blame hedge funds or other market participants for the turmoil in
Asia...Turbulence in the market is only a symptom of more serious underlying
problems  which  are  now  being  addressed  in  many  countries”
(Fischer/Camdessus  1998  cf.  Jayasuriya  and  Rosser  1999:  6).   The  crisis  is
viewed as  the determining proof  that  no alternative to  the neoliberal  Anglo-
Saxon type of capitalism ever existed. It is an over-extension of the Eurocentric
annihilation of Western superiority. 
It  is  in  its  essence  a  universalist  and  hegemonic  discourse  claiming  that
"progress is somehow permanent and natural in the European part of the world
but not elsewhere, and progress elsewhere is mainly the result of the diffusion of
the innovative ideas and products from Europe and Europeans" (Blaut 2000: xi).
In this sense Eurocentrism can be understood as the implicit view that societies
and cultures of European origin constitute the "natural" norm for assessing what
goes on in the rest of the world and an explicit a way to use capitalist crises as a
pretext to denounce alternatives and outright claim the superiority of neoliberal
hegemony  in  universalistic  terms.  This  double-move  repeated  itself  in  the
aftermath of the 2008 where the present claimed Euro sclerosis is used as pretext
for  downsizing  the  welfare  state  and  hard  won  entitlements  of  the  labor
movement and working people in general.
There are several reasons for this high degree of interest in this crisis. One is the
sheer  unexpectedness  and  magnitude  of  the  1997  crisis  that  struck  a  set  of
countries long considered to be friends of the Washington Consensus,2 and the
2 The Washington Consensus refers to the neo-liberal policy coming out of close collaboration
between the IMF and the World Bank under guidance/supervision by the US Treasury. The consensus was based
on a set of policies including financial sector liberalization, privatization of state-owned enterprises, fiscal
discipline, and trade, exchange rate and foreign investment deregulation. What is of interest here, however, is the
broader consensus in Washington that the capital account should be liberalized and the fact that key sectors of
the public sector should be deregulated and privatized. This includes social welfare, but quite peculiarly not the
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fact that foreign creditors needed an assurance that “the loans they had made to
the  bankrupt  finance  companies,  local  banks  and  local  enterprises  would  be
guaranteed  by  the  government,  on  the  grounds  that  not  compensating  the
creditors would provoke more capital flight and further reduce [the economies]
attractiveness as an investment site. This was, as the logicians say, the reductio
ad absurdum of the thinking that had dominated [the friends of the Washington
Consensus]  for  more  than  a  decade” (Bello  1998:  17).  No  matter  how  one
interprets this situation, which might indeed with some irony be termed ”a major
market  failure”,  subsequent  loans  from  the  IMF  went  to  repay  the  private
sector’s foreign creditors, who refused to be penalized by the market for bad
investments.3 However, this is not what is interesting here, but rather the new
convergence between Keynesian intellectuals who together with the ILO and the
World  Bank would like  to  see  the  Asian developmental  states  reformed and
transformed into Keynesian demand-driven economies - where emphasis is put
on  asset,  income  and  land-reforms,  progressive  taxation  and  social  justice
entering the political agenda (Bello ibid). The IMF (together with the Fed) put
oil on the fire, and the World Bank, UNDP, ILO and others came with the fire
extinguishers and suddenly called for social safety nets in Asia to prevent social
unrest  and  disastrous  social  consequences  (IHT April  16,  1998;  ILO 1998).
Indeed the World Bank itself in its 1999 report concurs about the former ”free
market showcase for the Third World: ”East Asia’s crisis is best seen as a story
of  rapid  growth built  on incomplete  foundations,  which was  left  exposed to
winds of the international capital markets. Now that the financial earthquake has
occurred,  it  will  have to  rebuild  its  success  on new foundations  in  its  trade
competitiveness”  (World  Bank  1999:  16).  Good  governance  is  the  new
buzzword, and indeed flexible labor markets and a renewed emphasis by the
World Bank on safety nets, institution building and civil society denotes that the
IMF and the World Bank differ in their interpretations and recommendations,
although it is difficult to discern what spin doctor advice is and what real change
is.
In a certain sense, the change of emphasis”parallels the attempts by Blair and
Clinton to  carve out  a Third  Way between the paths of Thatcherite economic
liberalism  and  old-fashioned  bureaucratic  interventionism  through  a  greater
articulation  of  the  role  of  the  state  as  a  facilitator  of  economic  reform”
labor market per se.
3 Banks from the EU countries were the largest creditors in East Asia $106 billion, Japanese banks
$68 billion, while U.S. banks only accounted for $ 18 billion (IHT April 14, 2000).
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(Jayasuriya and Rosser 1999: 11), and can be denoted as the post-Washington
Consensus.  An  interesting  U-turn  in  terms  of  policy  priorities,  but  also  an
unclear concept which has caused a great deal of disagreement among European
social democratic leaders and therefore it must be dealt with in careful way. For
instance  it  is  not  clear  whether  the  World  Bank  still  holds  the  view  that
globalization of production is expanding international trade and more trade will
mean  more  employment  opportunities.  And  the  dictum”fears  that  increased
international  trade  and  investment  and  less  state  intervention  will  hurt
employment  are  mainly  baseless” (World  Bank  1995:  60).  This  advice  was
followed by most countries and together with the premature liberalization and
deregulation of the financial sectors those were fundamentally the main causes
for the crisis, and it is therefore of interest to know whether this is still the case
or not in 2010.4 After all as the New York Times recently asked”Is the United
States no longer the global beacon of unfettered, free-market capitalism?” (NYT
17 Sept.  2008).  In  extending billions  in  lifeline private  companies  and even
nationalizing several conglomerates, Washington has not only turned away from
decades  of  rhetoric  about  the  virtues  of  the  free  market  and  the  dangers  of
government  intervention,  but  it  has  also  probably  undercut  future  American
efforts  to  promote  such  policies  abroad.  “For  opponents  of  free  markets  in
Europe and elsewhere, this is a wonderful opportunity to invoke the American
example,”  said Mario  Monti,  the  former  antitrust  chief  at  the European
Commission.  “They  will  say  that  even  the  standard-bearer  of  the  market
economy, the United States, negates its fundamental principles in its behavior.”
Mr. Monti said that past financial crises in Asia, Russia and Mexico brought
government to the fore, “but this is the first time it’s in the heart of capitalism,
which is enormously more damaging in terms of the credibility of the market
economy” (NYT 17 Sept. 2008).
The countries of East and Southeast Asia were hit differently by the crisis. Some
were seriously affected whereas others appear to have escaped rather lightly.
Especially  China  seems  to  have  been  able  to  ride  the  storm  without
fundamentally  altering  its  economic  policies.  However, social  protection and
labor market policies and programs have taken on sharply increased importance
in  China  in  recent  years  and the  Chinese  state  used  a  traditional  Keynesian
4For an interesting account, see Stiglitz who notes that”the U.S. Treasury Department pushed
liberalization in Korea in 1993 over the opposition of the Council of Economic Advisers. Treasury won the
internal White House battle, but Korea, and the world, paid the price” (Stiglitz 17 April, 2000).
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approach to jump start the market. This is a clear indication of the fact that the
countries of the region never represented or followed one development model.
Therefore,  a  rethinking  of  the  crises  in  1997  and  2008  should  also  be  a
rethinking of the East Asian model and it involves a discussion about the role of
social  and labor  policies  versus  flexibility  both by theoretical,  historical  and
empirical analysis. One impact of this rethinking is seen in the post-Washington
consensus mentioned above where social safety nets suddenly became important
in  World  Bank  parlance.  The  paradigm relies  on  careful  targeting  of  social
expenditures and social safety nets to enable social cohesion and social capital to
foster  smooth  structural  adjustment  without  creating social  havoc and at  the
same time saving the market from its own destruction.
This post-Washington Consensus might be interpreted as a boomerang for East
Asian  policymaker.  For  years,  the  regions  technocrats  cum  bureaucrats,
politicians  and  business  executives  looking  at  the  expensive  welfare  states,
regulatory  structures  and  redistributive  tax  policies  that  developed  in
Scandinavia,  had  proclaimed  the  necessity  of   following  a  different
developmental path. The main economic problems, before and now, of the non-
welfare states in East and Southeast Asia depend on their position in the world
economy.  Although  there  are  embryonic  welfare  constructions  they  are
paradoxically both globally unique and hybrids of existing welfare states. With
the emphasis on familialism and aversion to public social services, it remains a
paradox that in a comparative framework with Scandinavia, Continental Europe
and the Anglo-Saxon countries, East Asia´s social security arrangements have
lagged far behind its economic achievements (Esping-Andersen 1996: 9-10, 21,
23). 
The political and ideological content of the controversy on the socalled East West issue of
attitudes toward entitlements
Comparative political economists have developed different arguments regarding
the determinants of social policies. One type of argument points out those social
welfare policies convergen ces due to an underlying logic of industrialism, and
another see them as state responses to the social requirements of capitalism. A
third view approaches the problematique from quite another angle by suggesting
that the survival of market-based capitalism is essentially based on a Keynesian
strategy which saves it from self-destruction (Galbraith 1997: 5). The necessary
prerequisite is a compact between labor and capital. This type of argument is
based on two readings of the Keynesian Social Welfare state. One sees it as a
tool of compromise when the foundation of capitalism is at stake like during and
after the crisis in of the 1930s and post WW II. The second reading regards the
socio-economic  dimension  (i.e.  the  surplus  absorption);  by  functioning  as  a
demand  primer,  including  social  expenditures,  Keynesian  macroeconomics
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alleviates  the  tendency  towards  stagnation  (Schmidt  &  Hersh  2000:  8).
Nonetheless, those readings form the very basics of Scandinavian corporatism -
where the state is projected to be the arbiter between labor and capital.
This understanding is closely related to the important debate regarding the past
and present of the way ties to the world economy, patterns of geopolitical and
geo-economics competition, and processes of transnational cultures, ideologies
and policy discourses have influenced social policies. The impact of the external
determinants on social policy agendas and labor market policies cannot stand
alone,  but should be pared with an understanding of the impact of states on
social and labor market policymaking.5
These theoretical concerns make the recourse to history important - and broadly
speaking, the neoliberal prescriptions on social and labor market policies cannot
be based on the past record. History provides no clear examples of laissez-faire
policies which resulted in high wage economies capable of supporting widely
dispersed welfare benefits for a large population. Essentially what has happened
is what Bienefeld (1992: 31) once called the disarming of the state. Financial
deregulation is a route to an increasingly polarized society in which the majority
will suffer sustained welfare losses and in which the goal of a more humane,
caring and leisure-oriented society  will  soon be dismissed as  utopia.  This  is
exactly what is happening in 2010 as one of the main outcomes of the global
financial crisis is that “the promises of neoliberal globalization have failed to
materialize. Even adherents of the ideology of utopian “free-markets” seem to
fear that it has reached its end-point. The strategy of neoliberalism on the world
scale  has  become  synonymous  with  a  dysfunctional  calamity  of  hyper
exploitation, growing inequalities, and exclusive imposition of property rights
and greed for a tiny elite of super nova rich” (Schmidt 2010: 19).
In this regard the question which social sciences faces in view of globalization is
whether the process will result in greater social welfare or whether globalization
serves  to  reduce  the  social  dimension  of  twentieth  century  capitalism.  This
problematique has gained special significance in the context of the breakdown
of  East  Asian  authoritarian  capitalism  -  except  in  China.  Will  an  evolution
towards more democracy open the way to a greater contest over the economic
surplus/social product? How will the political systems absorb the demands of
the social classes at a time when adjustment to the conditionalities imposed by
the IFIs goes in the direction of the dismantling of the developmental state?
5 social policy here understood broadly as social security, health and education.
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One consequence of the effects of globalization and neoliberal hegemony has
been the ideologization of the role of the state in East Asia and implicitly the
region’s social welfare systems. Neoconservatives in Europe, the United States
and East Asia are seemingly in convergence when they point to the importance
of  culturally-bound  social  values  such  as  hard  work,  discipline,  enterprise,
family,  thrift,  responsibility  and  respect  for  authority.  Thus,  the  Weberian
interpretation of  European capitalism as a product  of  Protestantism has been
recycled  to  explain  the  so-called  East  Asian  miracle  in  terms  of  a  specific
Confucian  ethic.  In  fact  a  certain  ideological  convergence  has  made  its
appearance despite the much publicized divergences. Yet one of the results of
economic growth and the emergence of  East Asian self-confidence was based
on the fact that  "the preconditions for new political alliances spanning 'East' and
'West' are emerging," and "opponents of liberalism and social democracy, both
inside and outside 'Asia', are drawing on each others' arguments and views with
a growing synergy" (Rodan 1995: 2).  Nonetheless, although these ideologies
agree with the neoconservatives on the particular important aspect of defending
the rights of capital and business against perceived threats from labor and trade
unions, there are differences regarding their perception of the role of the state. 
Presumed  models  of  small  government,  company/corporate  welfare  systems,
and strong familial traditions (inside/outside distinctions, patriarchal authority,
strict gender role separation and female subordination) are being used to argue
against public social welfare expenditures. Indeed,  former Malaysian President
Mahathir Mohamad echoed views of European conservatives when he showed
distaste for socalled Western values and at the same time strongly emphasized
"the need to preserve the family unit, sexual propriety and respect for elders"
(FEER 20 August, 1992: 18). The Malaysian government’s official aim is to
establish a caring society and a caring culture: a social system in which society
will  come before  self:  in  which  the  welfare  of  the  people  will  revolve,  not
around  the  state  or  the  individual,  but  around  a  strong  and  resilient  family
system (Awang 1993: 185).   In Japan, the conservatives seek to reinvigorate
Confucian  familialism in  order  to  deal  with  problems  of  the  rapidly  ageing
population.  These  examples  closely  parallel  Christian  Democratic  policy  in
much of  Europe,  and  for  basically  the  same reason  they  are  unlikely  to  be
effective (Esping-Andersen 1996: .24). Even proponents of the Third Way see
social  security  arrangements  like  the  provident  fund  mechanism  found  in
Southeast Asia as one which could be recycled into Blair´s stakeholder society.
Also  the  World  Bank  has  recommended  this  “reverse  Orientalism”  (White,
Goodman and Kwon 1997) insurance model as one of three pillars essential for
“averting the old age crisis” (Ramesh 2000a: 3).
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Beneath the surface of these ideological divergences and convergences toward
social  welfare the bottom line of the debate is that social  security issues are
assuming  greater  importance.  It  is  being  realized  that  the  maldistribution  of
wealth and increasing vulnerability of modernizing social systems in East and
Southeast Asia can potentially lead to unrest and instability. It seems clear that
ideological and culturalized positions of social welfare have become a factor
which shape internal and external policy in various directions depending on the
social circumstances.
The sudden and massive shift in sentiments towards these countries on the part
of international financial markets, the relative ineffectiveness of efforts so far to
stabilize  markets,  and  the  general  failure  on  the  part  of  governments,
international organizations and markets to anticipate the crisis, poses new and
difficult problems. They raise critical issues of national and international public
policy in the context of growing globalization of financial markets. Foremost
among these issues is the question of what can be done to avert or reduce the
likelihood of similar crises in the future (ILO 1998: 8) and not least what can be
done to avoid a growing informalization of labor markets in East and West.
From Developmental State to Reregulation
Before  the  onset  of  the  crisis  in  1997,  East  and  Southeast  Asian  leaders
(including  Japan)  deliberately  encouraged  economic  growth  by  emphasizing
international competition through a calculated export-led strategy and avoidance
of social welfare programmes. This essentially anti-entitlement attitude laid the
groundwork for a stable societal order based on political ideology and a specific
set of social values. Policy-making in this regard promoted a political culture
which  claimed  that  public  welfare  reduces  productivity.  Despite  very  high
economic growth rates, some emphasis has been devoted to education and to a
lesser extent health. Social welfare expenditures were primarily located in the
private domain and concentrated on public employees. The explicit purpose of
this  course was to  avoid wage increases  and in  general  neutralize labor  and
oppositional  policy  groupings.  In  general,  this  particular  strategy  has  been
implemented either through co-opting, repressing or linking high growth and
increases  in  employment  opportunities  with  control  by  the  government.
However, historically speaking, there have been attempts and pressures from the
labor  movement  for  the state  to  adopt  and implement  social  security  related
legislation and policies but  in most cases these attempts were either brutally
crushed or incorporated into dominant elites ideology, narratives and symbols
regarding localism and self-sufficiency at household or village levels.
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By putting”politics in command” the developmental state in East Asia played an
important  role  in  the  capitalist  growth  process.  The  East  Asian  late
industrialization development model was based on the implementation of a
specific  understanding  of  political  economy,  whereby  the  state  assumed  a
function in the guidance of the economy without disregarding the importance of
the  market.  Government  policy-making  was  thus  organically  tied  to  the
production factors - land, labor and capital - in actively creating comparative
advantages.  Before the crisis neo-Listian theory enabled a clear explanation and
provided the definition of the East Asian developmentalist state which had”a
role different from that of the Keynesian welfare state in the already advanced
countries. The Keynesian welfare state serves to restrain market rationality by
measures to protect groups vulnerable to the consequences of market rationality.
In  contrast  the  developmentalist  state  restrains  market  rationality  in  order  to
pursue  a  policy  of  industrialization per  se” (Hoogvelt  1997:  206).  But  the
export-oriented strategy came to an impasse.  During the Cold War the White
House  offered  free  access  to  the  US  market  to  handful  non-communist
economies in the region.  Today competition has become harsh among Asian
economies, and not least the Chinese shift to a labor-intensive EOI strategy has
left the region with a drive downwards on prices and profits, and in any case,
there is  overproduction in almost  any productive sector  in  the real  economy
relative to the decline of outlets on the European and US markets. Furthermore,
the  developmental  state  with  its embedded  autonomy became  its  own
gravedigger.  The  very  success  of  the  developmental  state  in  structuring  the
accumulation  of  industrial  capital  changed  the  nature  of  relations  between
private capital and the state. As private capital became less dependent on the
resources  provided  by  the  state,  the  latter’s  dominance  diminished.  The
zaibatzus and chaebols became the  new masters  and  coupled  with  resurgent
distributional demands the elite networks and bureaucratic structures the state
became  transformed  into  a  new  type  of  regulatory  institution  (Evans  1992;
1995).
The problem for especially Southeast Asia is that the countries have very much
been subjected to the advice of IFIs to reduce state control of the economy and
society. The role model has been that projected by neoliberalism which in recent
years has also attacked the social compromise created by the”Welfare State” in
the West. In contrast, all historical experience shows that neoliberalism is not a
precondition for economic growth and achieving competitiveness in the world
market. The new post-Washington Consensus - the Third Way - does recognize
that  the  poor,  the  marginalized  and  those  in  the  informal  sector  should  be
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targeted,  but  also new labor market  policies regarding training,  upgrading of
qualifications and linking pension funds to savings will according to the new
paradigm create more efficient markets and social welfare. The point is that ”the
real debates in the next decade are not going to be about whether there should be
safety  nets  but  about  the  control,  management  and  generosity  of  retirement
funding in East Asia. In this sense, the new consensus is an attempt to seize the
policy agenda in response to a new range of demographic and social problems”
(Jayasuriya and Rosser 1999: 16).  The question is whether the”new approach”
resembles well-known neoliberal prescriptions such as advocated by Friedrich
von Hayek and Milton Friedman who projected three systems of welfare: the
family,  the  voluntary  sector  (charity),  and  the  free  market.  Accordingly,  the
state's role should be a residual and minimal one, and on very rare occasions,
should  it  involve  a  responsibility  limited  towards  means-tested  minimum
benefits and entitlements.
However, there are also important constraints for a successful implementation of
a  re-regulated  state  based  on  good  governance  and  still  relying  on  EOI
development (Schmidt 2010): 
1) The international environment is not as conducive to export-led growth
as it has been in the past.
2) It will be difficult to obtain political legitimacy enabling state capacities
to operate (the past experience weighs on the present).
3) The market is weakening the propensity of the state to fulfil its function
of guiding the economy.
4) The  state  is  being  weakened  by  the  loss  of  revenues  through  the
privatization of public property and national enterprises.
5) The political sphere is in distress and the state does not have the capacity
of establishing the social arrangement conducive to economic growth.
6) Furthermore, states in Europe, East- and Southeast Asia have to cater to
international multilateralism and goodwill.
The real  issue is  what  Ankie Hoogvelt  (1997:  113) convincingly argues that
there is a historical trend towards forms of production organization in which
capital no longer needs to pay for the reproduction of labor power. In the wake
of the 1997 and also 2010 crises participation in the global marketplace means
that  the  domestic  market  is  no longer  needed to  serve the  self-expansion of
capital. Jobless growth is what the present phase of capitalism is all about. ”It is
this process of globalization rather than any claimed imbalance in the national
accounts between public and private sector growth (the fiscal deficit), nor any
demographic imbalance (the greying population) that is the main reason for the
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perceived need to shed and restructure the welfare state which has become the
dominant political project in all advanced countries since the 1980s” (Hoogvelt
ibid).  Coupled with the fact that there is a”race to the bottom” in terms of job
flight as mentioned at a conference for East Asian union leaders hosted by the
AFL-CIO: ”As soon as we start to organize a union, the company threatens to
move to Vietnam,” and it was an unanimous view that international regulations
are  needed  to  keep  companies  from  moving  to  low-wage  economies  (Los
Angeles Times February 22, 1998).
The  socalled  East  Asian  and  China  miracles  have  been  used  to  confront
oppositional views and directly or indirectly produce an intellectual climate of
fear in the West with intimidations such as: If Asia rises, the West, or at least its
jobs  and  wages,  must  fall.  This  big  business  oriented  threat  claim  that  the
problem is "Western democracy itself, which runs the danger of ceasing to be a
vehicle  for  delivering  the  services  that  ordinary  people  want  from  the
government, and of becoming instead an instrument for helping strong lobbies
pick tax-payers' pockets. This is a danger that developing Asia has been fairly
good at avoiding" (The Economist 30 October 1993: 6). 
The OECD has warned that the costly and work-discouraging welfare apparatus
in the West is beginning to strike at the authority of the democratic system. This
essentially  self-fulfilling  argument  was  echoed  in  a  Far  Eastern  Economic
Review editorial: "For too long Western rights advocates have tended to equate
social progress with the growth of a welfare state, measuring commitment by
gross social spending. If Asia has managed to keep its families intact and its
economies growing, it is in no small part because countries here have for the
most part resisted this temptation. The West has shown how slippery the welfare
road can be, with benefits once granted quickly graduating to special interest
status and becoming permanent" (FEER June 23, 1994: 5).  
Paradoxically, while the welfare state in the West has been criticized for being
patronizing,  the  philosophy  of  individual  or  family  responsibility  for  the
provision of social security is only possible in the context of a paternalistic form
of government. It is reflected in the so far successful attempt “to control the
discourse on welfare in Singapore, and to treat welfare provisions as essentially
privileges  to  be  doled  out  at  the  discretion  of  the  government  in  return  for
gratitude from the citizenry” (Asher 1994: 70).  Apart from the Filipino case, the
paternalistic nature of state and governance can be extended to other East and
Southeast countries and even South Asia as well.
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This trend is also being underscored in the West by the growing emphasis by the
OECD on flexibility and low wages; but what is more important in this context
is the accompanying guideline according to which high non-wage employment
costs, such as social security and unemployment insurance, should be reduced.
"A reduction  of  the  non-wage  costs  is  recom mended,  especially  for  lower
salaries,"  and  governments  should  implement  "lighter  less  interventionist
regulation" (OECD Observer 1995: 41).
A comparison of expenditures on social welfare in Western Europe, the United
States and Japan shows that, "in Europe, the increasing reliance on a reserve
army of contingent workers reflects the growing concern on the part of corporate
management  that  the  expensive  social  net  is  making  their  companies  less
competitive on global markets" (Rifkin  1995: 201-202). On average, workers
enjoy longer  paid vacations  and work fewer  hours  besides  being 50 percent
more expensive than either U.S. or Japanese labor. Public spending in Europe is
the  highest  and  much  of  it  goes  to  finance  social  programs  to  protect  and
enhance the well-being of workers and their families. German social security
payments in 1990 were 25 percent of GDP, while the U.S. spent 15 percent and
only 11 percent in Japan. The finance of social entitlements required a corporate
tax burden in Germany which exceeds 60 percent, compared to 52 percent in
France, and only 45 percent in the U.S. Adding up all the expenditures of the
welfare  state  which  includes  costs  of  taxes,  social  security,  unemployment
benefits, pensions, and medical insurance - they amount to about 41 percent of
the total  GDP in Europe,  compared to 30 percent  in  the U.S.  and Japan.  In
contrast, in the early 1990s, the costs of social security and welfare accounted
for less than 5 per cent of total expenditure and net lending in Southeast Asia,
while an additional 3-5 percent was spent on health (Asher 1996: 72).
The  above  propositions  regarding  state  sanctioned  social  welfare  raise  the
question of how nation-states and policy-makers control the nature and impact
of globalization an important one. It is essentially a matter of how individual
states  adapt  and  respond  to  the  neoliberal  policies  of  keeping  wages  below
productivity  growth  and  downsizing  domestic  costs  which  have  led  to  an
unstable vicious circle of 'global competitive austerity': "Each country reduces
domestic demand and adopts an export-oriented strategy of dumping its surplus
production, for which there are fewer consumers in its national economy given
the decrease in workers' living standards and productivity gains all going to the
capitalists, in the world market. This has created a global demand crisis and the
growth  of  surplus  capacity  across  the  business  cycle"  (  Albo  1994:  147).
Furthermore,  the  convergence  between  low welfare  expenditures  and  export
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orientation  has  become part  and  parcel  of  the  tendency  to  position  national
economies in the international system.
Stephen  Gill  has  pointed  out  that  "Recent  growth  in  enclave  residential
development, private provision of security, and private insurance and health care
suggests that access to what were often considered to be public goods under
socialised  provision  is  now  increasingly  privatised,  individualised,  and
hierarchical  in  nature.  More  broadly,  there  has  been a  transformation  of  the
socialisation  of  risk  towards  a  privatisation  and  individualisation  of  risk
assessment and insurance provision. Nevertheless, this process is hierarchical:
For example, burdens of risk are redistributed, marketised, and individualised
(e.g.,  associated with illness, old age, or pensions) as opposed to being fully
socialised  through collective  and  public  provision.  (The  IMF and the  World
Bank have recently pressed for the privatisation of public pension provision,
especially in the Third World, to create larger local capital markets)" (Gill 1995:
407  and  fn.26).  Furthermore,  globalization  universalizes  the  labor  market,
thereby undermining labor  unions  and labor  standards  in  all  countries  -  this
might sound provocative but consider the fact that offshore hedge funds deposit
holdings now total 7-8 trillion dollars - close to the total gross domestic product
of the United States. The price is paid by national policy-making, social benefits
and the coherence of labor markets (UN March, 1999).6 
In  the  context  of  socio-economic  and  political  adjustment  of  neoliberal
globalization  the  question  is  whether  East  and  especially  Southeast  Asia
represents another type of welfare regime (a Third Way) with its combination of
low state social spending, weak labor movements and long working hours.
Social policy and Labor Policy in Southeast Asia compared with other regions
The following provides a discussion about the social security arrangements in
Southeast Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) compared
with East Asia (especially Korea and to a lesser degree Japan).
Before the crisis, Southeast Asia’s growth strategy necessitated that the demand
and  supply  of  economic  security,  of  which  labour  rights,  old-age  income
security,  and  health  care  are  major  components  should  be  kept  as  low  as
possible. Also, the major burden of their provision should be on the individuals
and families. The resulting economic insecurity, coupled with state control over
6 See UN Development Update
http://www.igc.org/globalpolicy/socecon/tncs/taxes99.htm.
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accumulated  mandatory  savings  provided  ideal  tools  for  social  and  political
control to the ruling elites. That there is a degree of hypocrisy involved here is
confirmed  by  the  fact  that  these  elites  do  not  need  to  face  such  economic
insecurity as they have defined-benefit pension plans for life. Accordingly, the
official policy and ideology on social welfare does not apply to individual elites’
personal plans.
All historical precedents of crises show that it is always a substantial shock to
any social system. But the effects of the 1997 crisis were amplified in the three
most severely affected countries by the absence of a meaningful social safety
net. Out of three countries, only Korea had an unemployment insurance system,
which was of recent origin and limited coverage and duration. Systems of social
assistance were also rudimentary.  The vast majority of displaced workers thus
had to fend for themselves during the crisis. In addition social expectations had
been shaped by extensive employment opportunities and this made the shock in
the  labour  market  all  the  ruder.  “Indeed  this  combination  of  sharp  and
unexpected social pain on the one hand, and the lack of collectively provided
relief on the other, is fertile ground for breeding social unrest” (ILO 1998: 12).
The centrality of the state with regard to capacity and will can be compared by
looking at central government expenditure on social programs. While there was
traditionally  one  social  welfare  department  in  Southeast  Asia  or  at  least  an
agency, it typically had a very modest budget and no basic-needs mandate. Not
surprisingly,  during  the  period  from  1972  to  1990,  the  share  of  central
government  expenditure  on  'housing,  amenities,  social  security  and  welfare'
among  the  Southeast  Asian  countries  ranged  from a  0.9  percent  increase  in
Malaysia,  to  a  decrease  of  1.2  percent  in  Thailand,  0.6  percent  increase  in
Indonesia,  and a  2  percent  drop in  the  Philippines.  Placed in  the  context  of
comparative Third World development this was markedly lower than the 16.2
percent average for middle-income LDCs in 1985 and also much lower than the
average in most of the Latin American and South Asian countries. These pre-
crisis figures indicate that already a decade ago there was a potential conflict
over rising living expectations and pressure on the delivery of public goods and
services (Schmidt 1998: 52). The state-provided social security programmes in
the region, although covering civil servants and military personnel, leave large
gaps in coverage. At the lowest end is Indonesia, where the various schemes
cover 9 per cent of the population and 20 per cent of the labor force. Active
contributors to the Central Provident Fund in Malaysia form 20 per cent of the
population and 50 per cent of the labor force. Those who are excluded from
statutory  schemes  are  usually  who  need  public  support  the  most:  domestic
servants,  casual  workers,  seasonal  workers  and the majority  of  farmers.  The
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anomaly is the result of the governments efforts to keep public expenditures on
social  security  down,  which  leads  them  to  establish  programmes  that  are
partially  or  fully  funded  from contributions  by  employees  and/or  employers
(Ramesh 2000b: 178).
In comparing Southeast Asia and East Asia it is worthwhile to emphasize six
important differences:7
1)  The  level  of  income  equality  has  been  much  higher  in  East  Asia  than
Southeast Asia.8
2) Public expenditures on education have been much higher in East Asia than
Southeast Asia especially in terms of targeting higher education.
3) Public expenditures on health are low by any standard, and rely primarily on
private sector and individual resources.
3) Expenditures on social security have been equally low in both cases relative
to their economic level.
4) Poverty has increased tremendously after the crisis - for instance in Indonesia
conservative estimates that poverty might be as high as 50 per cent.  
5)  Statutory  social  security  is  being  expanded  in  Korea  and  Taiwan  while
Southeast Asia seems to be moving in the direction of charity and philanthropy.
6) Southeast Asian countries are increasingly turning to the private sector in the
provision and/or financing of social programmes.
It might be worth repeating that no single East or Southeast Asian welfare state
exists  as  in  fact  the  history  of  welfare  is  determined  by  the  distinctive
7I don’t want to spend to much space here on the social data as others have done that already. See for
instance Ramesh with Asher (2000) from where some of the information in 1-6 above has been adapted; Gough
(2000); Goodman, White and Kwon (1998); and Hersh and Schmidt (forthcoming).
8According to the World Wealth Report 1999 from Merill Lynch and Gemini Consulting, the
region’s wealthy managed to increase their collective worth by 10 % year-on-year in 1998 to $4.4 trillion. Their
secret? It’s threefold: They hold much of their assets overseas; when the crisis hit they shifted from local
currencies to the U.S. dollar, and most importantly, they did not panic, but rode out the equity storm. They can
look forward to even greater riches: Their collective value is predicted to soar 63% from the 1998 figure to $7.2
trillion by 2003 (cf FEER June 3, 1999). 
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institutional matrix of politics in each country (Kwon 1998: 66).  What those
societies and regions do share is that conservative forces have so far dominated
the  debate  regarding  social  welfare  and  those  labor  unions  and  workers  in
general have not been able to any significant degree to enter the policy agenda
regarding social policy. This might be interpreted as a specific ideology based on
an  organic  understanding  of  state  and  society.  An  ideology  which  has  been
described as “corporatism without labor”, whereby the state, the conglomerates,
and  the  banks  worked  hand-in-glove,  but  labor  was  systematically  excluded
(Cumings 1999: 37).
The  reason  for  this  is  related  to  the  labor  market  policies  which  share  the
infamous doctrine described above across East and Southeast Asia. It is evident
that  the  strategies  taken have  been  based  on  labour  discipline  and  peaceful
industrial relations which are an important prerequisite for EOI development.
Although there have been periods of repression and periods of freer organization
of labour in the region, the development strategy of the political and business
elite has always built around the marginalization of labour. This type of labour
market regulation (usually tight and repressive with brief periods of more loose
policies) has had the consequence that  trade unionism has been weak or co-
opted by the state or in the case of Korea, although illegal,  it  has also been
militant  and in strong competition with the corporatist-based union.  The key
problem,  no  matter  how  one  defines  democracy,  has  been  political
representation.  Labour  and  other  marginalised  groups  haven’t  had  an
institutionalized voice in the political arena. Historical evidence shows clearly
that,  this  is  not  a  matter  of  "new  politics",  but  related  to  repression  and
outlawing of alternatives to the dominant discourse of growth, exports and elite
paternalism (Schmidt 2000).
During both the early and late phases of EOI labor market policies in the region
have been rather successful in mobilizing domestic labor resources. Rarely have
labor  posed  a  significant  threat  to  employers  at  the  local  level.  In  all  the
countries under scrutiny, except the Philippines, the control or elimination of the
left went hand in hand with an extension of state control over labor activism and
the incorporation of labor into directly or indirectly state controlled unions. The
historical background is well known, and it is also well documented that this
was done with the help and advice of the United States and Great Britain all
over the region during the Cold War.  The result has been exclusion of organized
labor  and  the  fact  that  markets  determined  wages  independent  of  union
interference. Micro-corporatist unionism and decentralization later on became a
strategy to upgrade skills and training especially in Korea, while in Southeast
Asia who was a late-comer in EOI driven industrialization, there was and still
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are  strong  labor  controls  which  basically  can  be  explained  by  the  heavy
dependence on foreign investment.  
With  affluence,  demographic  change  and  greater  democratization  in  Korea,
Taiwan,  Mainland China and to a  certain extent  Southeast  Asia,  demand for
economic security has been growing.  By the late  1980s there was a  general
decline in  fears  of  mass  empowerment  in  the business  sectors  in  Korea and
Taiwan and the relationship between capital and labor began gradually to move
away from zero-sum-conflicts.  Moreover, the task of controlling the agenda of
social policy was becoming more difficult because of affluence which provided
more choice,  and because of  the  information revolution.  Today the financial
crises in 1997 and 2008 started the region is in a transition phase searching for
new models and new ways to cope with new demands both from the IFIs and
other international actors and institutions, and not least growing demands from
within the domestic social fabric.
Corporatism With Labor (The Scandinavian Model)
In  a  well-known  article  Walter  Korpi  presents  a  general  framework  for
comparing social policy strategies in a comparative perspective. The focus is put
on the distributional arrangements in each society and the key variable is the
way in which working classes have been incorporated into politics. Welfare is
seen in terms of pressures from below and as pressures from a particular class
(Korpi 1980). He found at least five types of working class organization and
control in the capitalist countries during the post-war period 1946 to 1979. What
is  of  interest  to  note  here  is  that  based  on  Korpi´s  data  there  were  great
differences between the countries in these respects. This might imply that based
on historical and empirical evidence there are more roads to social welfare than
we might expect, and this might also provide some leavage to the argument that
East and Southeast Asia consist of many different societies and hence different
types of  working class pressures may result in varying social welfare models. A
fact, which is confirmed a number of studies by Gösta Esping-Anderson who
initially  described  the  infamous  three  worlds  of  welfare,  but  is  now  more
inclined to talk about four or even five models. Esping-Anderson´s definition of
social  welfare  policy  as  policy  designed  to  help  those  who  suffer  from the
irregularities of capitalism based on transfer payments which help established
payments is the most promising because it is broad and flexible.
In this connection what is characteristic of the Scandinavian model is that it is
based on principle of universalism, which strives to keep unemployment at low
levels,  and  includes  women in  the  labor  force.  However,  social  benefits  are
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disbursed to all regardless of social status and not related to the position in the
labor markets exclusively. It is exactly this aspect which makes it different from
the German and the Anglo-Saxon model where the latter is based on the neo-
liberal  principle  of  means-tested  aid  meaning  that  it  only  helps  the  socially
disadvantaged, and thereby leaves itself open to welfare backlash.
Corporatism can be defined as some kind of "natural" organic unity of societies
and a "natural" division of society into various groups each with its "proper"
roles. In the literature of political science, it  can have fascist or quasi-fascist
connotations and can also refer to a system of intermediation between interest
groups  and  the  state  based  upon  peak  associations  granted  a  monopoly  of
representation  within  their  sector  of  society  (Schmitter  1979).  Furthermore,
Peter J. Katzenstein has defined a well-known model of political economy he
calls "liberal corporatism" (Katzenstein 1984, 1985). And, of course, the post-
war model of Scandinavian corporatism became a rough synonym for the social
democratic  welfare  state.  In  Weir’s  and  Skockpol’s  essay  on  Keynesian
responses to the Great Depression they note that Sweden and the United States
applied  different  policies,  thereby  reinforcing  the  differences  in  the  original
societal  set-up.  The  reason  why  it  is  extremely  difficult  in  the  long-run  to
establish any kind of statist co-ordination of policy, and especially one which
favors social welfare in the U.S. is the combination of separation of powers at
the center together with federalism. While in Sweden the state is centralized and
has a unitary nature including major interest groups which increased both the
knowledge and the drive necessary to run such a policy (Weir and Skockpol
1983). Although this is still the case today this example shows clearly that there
is  not one model  or  convergence  in  the  organization  of  different  types  of
corporatism, but many types also in terms of social and labor market policies.
For instance, one study notes a striking difference between macro and micro
corporatism where the first  is exemplified by Sweden (Scandinavia),  and the
latter by Japan and especially Germany. Large companies in these countries are
supported by a mass of subsidiaries and smaller firms, often relying on cheap
and non-unionized labor, sometimes bereft of basic labor rights as defined by the
ILO as  in  the  case  of  Japan and Germany.  Such a  society  is  dual,  whereas
Scandinavian countries in the European context are homogenous.
Corporatism in the Scandinavian case is based on cooperation while in the East
and Southeast Asian case it is based on co-optation and incorporation of various
institutions especially those associated with the labor market. The question is
therefore  not  which  instruments  the  state  should  use  to  support  corporatism
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including labor, but rather how the state can establish a policy dialogue with
societal actors. In other words: before anything else, state and societal actors
must  establish new governance structures.  This  applies  to  necessary changes
internal  to  business  associations  and  trade  unions  as  well  as  to  networking
between them. The state has to establish close consultation and collaboration
within the bureaucracy, and to cut its overly detailed interventions into economic
and social processes. Societal actors have to establish a certain degree of internal
cohesion.  This  is  particularly  difficult  in  traditional  corporatist  environments
where associations received their mandate from the state rather than from their
members. Only then will policy networks emerge that aim at problem-solving
rather than at confrontation or exclusion. 
As we have seen the general mode of “corporatism without labor” in especially
Southeast  Asia is  not conducive to an emulation of the Scandinavian model.
However, recent developments in Korea show that this depends very much on
the  ability  of  labor  to  organize  and  maybe  even  more  importantly  to
institutionalize a political party which can fight for the rights of workers and the
type of welfare state best suited to each country. The old-style corporatism was
based  on  state  structuring  of  interest  representation  though  a  quasi-
representational monopoly. What the new style corporatism will be based upon
remains to be seen, but below three plausible scenarios regarding both social
welfare reform and labor market reform for the near future are discussed.
Three  possible  scenarios  for  social  policy  and  labor  market  reform
(Corporatism With or Without Labor)
It  is  possible  to  discern  three  scenarios  from  this  analysis. One scenario is
related to a possible replication of the two-tier non-welfare corporatist approach
in Japan. The second scenario is related to problems of demographic change and
health, such as the ageing population and changes in family patterns on the one
hand  and  on  the  other  the  increasing  importance  of  self  inflicted  and
degenerative diseases such as HIV/AIDS, heart ailments and cancer which will
create immense pressures on the financing of health care, and release pressures
on the  state  because  of  the  prohibitive  costs  of  private  insurance. The  third
scenario is related to the increasing influence of labor on the political agenda
especially with regard to social and labor market policies. This evolution is the
outcome  of  a  number  of  factors:  The  growing  unevenness  and  unequal
distribution of wealth; a response based on social and democratic rights to the
so-called notion of “Asian values”; democratization and the social consequences
of the crisis. This is evident in all the countries in the region, but the case of
Korea is singled out as the “Tiger” in terms of the new agenda based on labor´s
rights which are based on the strength of trade unions.
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Enter the first scenario. As the experience of Japan has shown,  Southeast Asia
might enter a period of corporatism “without labor”,  which denotes a highly
policy  coordinated  system  but  with  a  relatively  small  unionized  workforce
belonging  to  company  unions  whose  national  federations  are  weak  and
politically  marginalized.  At  the  micro  level,  a  system  of  private  welfare
corporations consisting of an array of workforce training facilities as well as
assurances of employment security, reinforced with an array of corporate social
welfare services. Private welfare corporatism is presented as a way of showing
labor=s  interests  and  achieving  consensus,  which  should  mirror  the  macro
forms of cooperation found in Northern Europe. According to Sanford Jacoby,
such  micro  corporatism  also  compensates  partially  for  the  lack  of  labor
representation  in  the  Japanese  political  economy.  Thus  Japan  is  a  two-tier
system combining statist “Corporatism without labor” with enterprise “Welfare
Corporatism”. This two-tier approach also exists elsewhere in East Asia, notably
in Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea (Jacoby 1995: 21).9 However, this model
might also be called “employer paternalism”, indicating a particular mode of
government  (indirect  control/support)  which paradoxically can be seen as  an
outcome of the official belief in laissez faire. In Malaysia the percentage of in-
house unions, before the government launched its “Look East policy”, was 47
percent,  and this  figure increased to 54.5 percent  in  1988.  With government
support, this type of unionization will increase significantly in the near future,
implicating  some  success  in  emulating  their  Northeastern  counterparts
(Arudsothy and Littler 1993: 128-130).
Enter the second scenario. The capacity for nation-wide social pacts is however
closely connected to the issues raised in this paper. This scenario points to future
potential  political  instability  in  the  region,  such  as  labor  unrest,  foreign
domination  of  the  national  corporate  sectors,  and  unequal  economic
development exacerbated by competition for capital investment and markets in
similar  products.  Also  the  middle  class  has  high  expectations,  particularly
related to  the  infrastructure  of  cities,  and is  pressuring governments  and the
private  sector  to  place  higher  priority  on  urban  environmental  improvement
(Webster 1995: 89).
9      For a comparative discussion of weaker, but emerging types of micro corporatism in Toyota and
Mitsubishi plants in Thailand, see (Deyo1995: 134--140); and in Proton Saga plants in Malaysia, see (Rasiah
forthcoming).
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Some political leaders such as Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew saw their countries’
economic  future  in  terms  of  an  educated  workforce.  This  obviously  implies
growing commitments to education, health, and social services, and might well
undermine the current non-welfare regime. What seems even more irreversible
is an “attitudinal shift from the dynastic to the life-cycle view of income and
consumption under which accumulated savings are more likely to be spent than
bequeathed" (Asher 1995: 16).
This is a critical point, because it shows the paradox of embryonic welfare state
construction in East and Southeast Asia. It is globally unique and represents a
hybrid of existing welfare state characteristics in particular with an essence close
to the neoliberal ideal model. Another concern is the possible negative impact on
savings. The Asian tigers= economic miracle was premised on high saving rates
rather  than Keynesianism: Families  save for  lack of  adequate social  security
coverage. "A genuine welfare state, it is feared, will undermine this incentive"
(Esping-Andersen  1996:  24).  This  view  is  reflected  in  the  priorities  of  the
Malaysian  policy  elite:  “What  contributions  social  security  can  make  to
economic  development  has  become  the  priority  rather  than  the  social
protection.” (Karto 1985).
Although policy elites claim that social structures remain intact, they still try to
reinforce a distinctive Asian culture.  So far the state has been able to maintain
the  primacy  of  societal  or  group  interests  over  those  of  the  individual,  but
affluence  and  widespread  Western-based  education  and  economic  and  social
ties, are likely to increase the tension between the two especially if economic is
not as dynamic as was the case previously.
Furthermore,  the  extended  family  is  on  the  decline.  The  trend  towards  the
nucleus  family  and  smaller  families  continues  to  gather  pace  with  grave
consequences for the ability of the family unit to take care of the older members
and the disabled. What is at stake is the collapse of the traditional social support
networks. The situation of social security in Indonesia Awill depend essentially
on the economic development of the country until employment in the formal
sector can be expanded considerably - and the organizational prerequisites for
comprehensive social security thereby fulfilled - traditional forms of insurance
will continue to predominate" (Queisser 1991).  However, even in Indonesia,
economic growth has changed the structural composition of the work force. This
is visible in the considerable decline of agricultural employment and increasing
urbanization.  One  consequence  has  been  that  “villages  become  urbanized,
access to land denied, and workers are losing the informal social security net
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that had supported them in times of need. The other safety device, namely the
high labor absorption capacity of the informal sector that had earlier supported
industrial workers and their families is now also endangered” (Evers 1995: 169).
Also the  effects  of  social  and economic change on family  structures  have a
considerable impact on the problem of the aged. Many Southeast Asian writers
have  expressed  deep  concern,  because  the  number  of  old  people  requesting
institutional  services  indicates  the  severity  of  the  problem.  Long  before  the
financial crisis many Thai writers called for state involvement: “Many elderly
people in Thailand are neglected by their children and the government has to
accept responsibility for them” (Wongchai 1985: 375).
In the role-model of Japan, the hitherto distinctive “Asian values” as the place of
hierarchy and social conservatism, which originally encouraged discipline, now
seems to stifle new innovations and new ideas. Social harmony is waning and
leisure is no longer managed by paternalist social relations. To give one example
of  these  changing  social  relationships  and  their  possible  impact  on  social
welfare: "People no longer choose to live in biggish family groups: the average
household size has fallen from 4.5 in 1960 to 3.1 today. More people live alone:
single-member  households,  a  mere  3  % in  1955,  made  up  23  % by  1990"
(Economist 1994: 58).
Taking further into consideration the fact that the younger urban generation has
no memory or knowledge of poverty, another generational problem is added to
what  seems  to  be  emerging  in  the  horizon.  The  question  is  whether  this
generation in the longer  run can accept  the privatized systems of  welfare in
Southeast Asia which exists in a vacuum of a proper system of social security
benefits  and  subsidized  health.  This  is  further  exacerbated  by  a  severe
demographic  problem  consisting  of  massive  migration  into  urban  industrial
centers, a process which undermines traditional forms of social protection. In
East Asia, this poses a dilemma between hypothetical welfare construction and
corporate  plans,  and  the  traditional  stress  on  familialism  with  its  care
obligations.
Enter the third scenario. In Thailand, there is increasing evidence that because
of the low state schemes for improving the income and welfare of employees to
catch up with  inflation,  workers  initially  concentrated on demands for  wage
increases. But this pattern is probably changing. This is clear from the fact that
Amajor issues of labor disputes from 1987 to 1989 concerned welfare (33 per
cent)  wages (20 per cent)  conditions of employment (18 per cent)  and other
issues (29 per cent)" (Piriyarangsan and Poonpanich 1994: 241). The struggle to
23
obtain social security protection in Thailand dates back to the 1950s, but in the
late 1980s renewed pressure through public demonstrations and campaigns from
the Labor Congress and Trade Union Congress resulted in the promulgation of
the Social Security Act of 1990.  The first phase was implemented in 1992 and
covers health insurance, maternity benefit, disability benefit and death benefit.
The  scheme is  financed  by  employers,  employees  and  the  government  each
paying 1.5 percent of wages as contributions, but there is serious debate about
the second phase. The labor movement in Indonesia played a significant role in
the ousting of Soeharto, and if the military stays in their barracks, it will play a
role  in  determining the destiny of  the  economy and its  social  and industrial
relations.
As mentioned above, the Korean labor organization KCTU participated in the
tripartite negotiations between the government and business for the first in 1998.
After years of illegal activities culminating in the famous strikes in 1987 they
have more leverage than the corporate union-based KFTU. Because of labor´s
strength even in white collar ranks the ”peak bargaining” can be interpreted as
labor´s biggest gain ever (Cumings 1999). A victory which might be emulated
by other trade unions in the region. Although the Arank and file@ membership
of the KCTU rejected the comprise it is a step in the direction of dialogue and
with renewed pressure from the World Bank and even the IMF to set up social
safety nets and unemployment schemes it seems that a ”New Deal” for South
Korea  is  still  far  away.  One  disturbing  point  in  this  connection  is  the  still
unsolved problem with regard to the untapped cheap labor pool in North Korea,
which could serve as a reserve army pressing wages downwards. 
Summing based up and especially based on the Korean example it is clear that
the approach of non-welfare by Southeast Asian policy elites is only possible to
implement if an autocratic political system is in place to restrict the rights of
individuals, to ban labor rights and to enforce controls of the media. The real
achievement of such a system is not social security but social control, and is
probably not possible any more.
Tentative Conclusion: Southeast Asia between Neoliberalism and the Quest
for Welfare
The  problem  of  social  welfare  in  Southeast  Asia  has  closely  followed  the
neoliberal  ideology  which  is  essentially  a  matter  of  identifying  needs,  solve
problems and create opportunities at the individual level. The causes behind the
needs for support are believed to rest overwhelmingly in individuals and sub-
cultural  defects  and  dispositions.  Responsibility  is  deflected  from states  and
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national  economic,  administrative  and  legal  organizations  to  individuals  and
groups. Little or no attention is paid to the interacting consequences of economic
and social change for families, employment, taxation, housing, social security
and  public  services.  Laissez-faire  individualism  and  the  legitimation  of
discrimination are in fact the intellectual sources of this tradition.
This particular version of social welfare is in practice closely based on welfare
theories about social philanthropy. It is difficult to discern anything specifically
resembling  “Asian values” in this context, except for the fact that it rests on a
particular  ideology  which  is  used  as  a  repressive  tool  to  discipline  labor's
demands for  social  security and in general  demands of  the workforce which
could  humanize  and  socialize  work  and  living  conditions  and  economic
relations.
As the above has suggested, the debate about social and cultural values, can be
used  for  various  political  purposes  according  to  ideology  and  the  current
political  expediency.  Singapore’s  philosophy  regarding  social  security
discourages any kind of system akin to the European model. To its leaders, it is
important  that  Singaporeans  do  not  lean  on  social  security,  be  spoiled  and
become Asoft@. The hypocrisy is profound, when taking into consideration the
fact that Singapore is probably the first high-income country in the world which
attempts to provide social security while rejecting the main foundations of the
welfare state. This is done through a system of individual provisions, rejection
of social insurance, and an extremely limited public assistance system based on
the Poor Law tradition (Asher 1996: 4-5). This is a variant of the Anglo-Saxon
subordination of social issues to “business as usual” which projects a distorted
and false picture of East and Southeast Asian societies. These are on the one
hand portrayed to be characterized by low rates of government spending, strong
family ties and on the other by a philanthropic entrepreneurial spirit whereby the
owners  of  productive capital  fulfill  a  social  function as  the benefactors  who
complement the family, as providers of work, shelter and medicine in case of
illness, unemployment or marginalization of workers. In fact, these values are
very close to those known in Victorian England.
But it is probable that the financial crisis and its solution offer some lessons
which  would-be  Third  World  late-developers  ought  to  take  seriously.  In
conclusion  it  might  be  worth  quoting  one  insider’s  view from the  worst  hit
country who says that: ”Today, instead of turning their attention away from East
Asia because of the crisis, developing countries may find the region an even
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more  relevant  place  from which  to  learn  about  mistakes  that  should  not  be
repeated” (Soesastro 1998: 312). 
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